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2 measure. Such an approach emphasises the importance of domestic decision making processes to Strasbourg adjudication -and in so doing illustrates but one of the mechanisms by which the European Court gives life to the notion of subsidiarity 6 -but it also runs the risk of dilution of the Convention's potency; procedural propriety cannot be a proxy for proportionality, nor for ultimately ensuring the maintenance of the Convention's minimum standards. 7 Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter HRA), the United Kingdom's jurisprudence on rights protection has been umbilically linked to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In spite of this, process review is at once orthodox and alien to United Kingdom constitutional law. Fair process lies at the heart of the common law of judicial review of administrative action; alongside illegality and irrationality, procedural impropriety provides one of the established grounds by which public authority decision making might be challenged.
Traditionally, by contrast, legislative review has not been a feature of United
Kingdom constitutional law and the courts have long regarded the propriety of legislative processes as lying within the exclusive domain of Parliament. Though the enactment of the HRA facilitates, and renders constitutionally permissible, a species of legislative review in the United Kingdom -additionally creating a statutory requirement that public authorities act compatibly with the Convention rights to which it gives further effect -the extent to which an effective translation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence engaging with process review has taken place is unclear.
In the first instance, it is clear that there is uncertainty amongst the domestic judiciary as regards the place of process-based review in the case-law of the Strasbourg court. The sense that the European Court of Human Rights is largely focused on matters of substance -to the virtual exclusion of procedural review -has served to minimise the relevance of procedural review in HRA adjuciation concerning executive (public authority) decision-making. 8 Taking their lead from the supposed 6 See also: Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR SE7, at [84] . 7 On the heightened scrutiny required by a proportionality -as opposed to reasonableness or rationality -inquiry, see: R (on the application of Daly) 10 In doing so, the United Kingdom's apex court reveals a potential disconnect between the adjudicative approach to the Convention rights taken at the national and supra-national levels and simultaneously appears to eschew one of the standard tenets of domestic judicial review.
The picture is complicated by the adjudicative differences between judicial (administrative) and legislative review at the domestic level; the former being traditionally driven by concerns relating to procedural legitimacy, the latter not only historically regarded as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty but more broadly obstructed by the fact that parliamentary process has been long considered to be non-justiciable. While in its examinations of the Convention-compliance of primary legislation under the HRA the United Kingdom's apex court has stopped short of questioning the legitimacy of domestic legislative procedure, a closer engagement with legislative deliberative process than has traditionally been permitted has become evident, with courts taking the 'quality of the legislative decision-making process into account when assessing whether legislation is compatible with Convention rights'; 11 prior to the implementation of the HRA such an approach would have been regarded as being constitutionally illegitimate.
The extent to which techniques of procedural review have been adopted in domestic adjuciation concerning the Convention rights therefore provides a lens through which the interplay between domestic and supra-national judicial processes and reasoning can usefully be examined, raising questions relating to the purpose of the HRA, subsidiarity and complementarity within the Convention system and the intensity of proportionality review as carried out by the Strasbourg and domestic courts. 
II: Process and Substance in the European Court of Human Rights

4
In adjudication under the HRA, the European Court of Human Rights has frequently been portrayed as concerned only with the substance of a decision taken by national
authorities. As Lord Bingham outlined in R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School:
the focus at Strasbourg is not and has never been on whether a challenged decision or action is the product of a defective decision-making process, but on whether, in the case under consideration, the applicant's Convention rights have been violated.
12
As such, proportionality is viewed as 'a test … which the Court applies in order to structure its own decision-making rather than a decision-making structure that it seeks to impose on primary decision-makers. specific and complex assessment' of the balance to be struck. 28 The court went on to thoroughly outline the process by which the challenged ban on political advertising had been enacted (and subsequently found to be compatible with the requirements of Article 10 in domestic adjudication). The court noted that:
The prohibition was … the culmination of an exceptional examination by
Parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the prohibition as part of the broader regulatory system governing broadcasted public interest expression in the United Kingdom, and all bodies found the prohibition to have been a necessary interference with art.10 rights.
[…]
The proportionality of the prohibition was, nonetheless, debated in some detail before the High Court and the House of Lords … both levels endorsed the objective of the prohibition as well as the rationale of the legislative choices which defined its particular scope and each concluded that it was a necessary appreciation, it will often be the case that the Court is, essentially, referring to Parliament's discretion to legislate as it sees fit in that particular area.' 9 which is critical of domestic decision-making process demonstrates that procedural review cannot be uniformly seen as such. Rather, procedural review is best encapsulated as one of a number of mechanisms at the disposal of the court which may be utilised in order to emphasise the subsidiarity in the Convention system.
That process review is essentially a discretionary tool in the hands of the Court is, however, problematic. A lack of specificity as regards the circumstances in which the Court might invoke procedural techniques of review has prompted a degree of concern relating to the consistency of the Court's adjudicatory approach. 35 It is further acknowledged -and evidenced by the fine margin by which the Animal Defenders
International case was decided 36 -that the Court itself is divided on the extent to which domestic processes should influence the standard of Strasbourg review. 37 Both factors can be seen to underpin -in part at least -the uncertain domestic response to procedural human rights review pursuant to the HRA.
III: Procedural Judicial Review in the United Kingdom
Judicial Review in the United Kingdom is bifurcated, with review of administrative action and of legislation regarded as being conceptually distinct. As regards the former, judicial review of administrative action remains a largely procedural guarantee; the common law of judicial review provides for a supervisory, rather than an appellate, jurisdiction which is focused on the legality of a decision (rather than its merits, or substance). 38 Judicial review of legislation meanwhile is a relatively recent addition to a constitutional system in which legislative process lay -and which substantially lies still -beyond the realms of justiciability. Legislative review is limited to scenarios in which domestic statute is alleged to be in contravention of European laws; 39 there exists no freestanding or common law power to review the constitutionality or legality of primary legislation. Enactment of the HRA has therefore legitimated judicial scrutiny of the compatibility of primary legislation with the Convention rights, 40 and introduced a statutory species of illegality to the existing common law grounds of judicial review (introducing a further sub-division into the domestic law of judicial review in so doing 41 ). The foundation of the latter can be found in Section 6 of the HRA which renders it 'unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.' As will be seen, this provision has also been interpreted as directing courts' analysis towards the substance of public body decision making and away from the traditional procedural focus of judicial review at common law. . It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.
[…] I have described the third head as "procedural impropriety" rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.'
39 Pursuant to the provisions of the European Communities Act 1972 and Human Rights Act 1998. 40 Section 3(1) HRA provides: 'So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights' (s.4
permits that legislation which cannot be rendered compatible with the Convention rights via interpretative means may be subject to a judicial declaration of incompatibility).
Fair process lies at the very heart of English administrative law:
The teeth of public law are in process review. Most successful judicial review claims succeed on the basis that the decision-maker has done something in the wrong way, rather than the decision-maker has done something that is, all things considered, unjustifiable.
42
Many of the central principles of the common law of judicial review of administrative action can therefore be seen to highlight procedural flaws or defects in executive decision-making. As such, decisions might be challenged -and might be demonstrated to fail to meet the standards required under the head of natural justiceon the ground that the relevant decision-maker was biased, 43 that the claimant was denied a fair hearing 44 or that the claimant enjoyed a reasonable expectation which had been frustrated by the decision. 45 Similarly, procedural defects in decisionmaking may also give rise to a challenge on the basis of a decision's illegality; taking decisions on the basis of irrelevant considerations 46 and the use of an allocated power for an improper purpose 47 both amount to essentially procedural grounds of illegality.
The common law jurisdiction of judicial review has therefore traditionally eschewed review of the substance, or merits, of executive or administrative decisions;
judicial review permits intervention in defective public body decision-making, it does not permit the court to substitute its own decision for that which has been challenged. It must surely be for Parliament to lay down the procedures which are to be followed before a Bill can become an Act. It must be for Parliament to decide whether its decreed procedures have in fact been followed. It must be for 
IV: Process Review and the influence of the Human Rights Act
That the HRA was not intended to vest disproportionate authority in the judges -to the detriment of the elected branches of government -is well documented. 57 To the extent that it is a meaningful term of constitutional discourse, the HRA is a 'dialogic' instrument, which allocates responsibility for the realisation of the rights it protects across the branches of state. To this end, the processes of public body decisionmaking were almost certainly intended to be impacted upon by the enactment of the a culture of respect for human rights is to create a society in which our public institutions are habitually, automatically responsive to human rights considerations in relation to every procedure they follow, in relation to every decision they take, in relation to every piece of legislation they sponsor. Every public authority will know that its behaviour, its structure, its conclusions and its executive actions will be subject to this culture.
60
Enforcement of the HRA therefore imposes upon public bodies (including courts, but excluding Parliament) a statutory obligation to act in compliance with the Convention rights.
Though the Act excluded Parliament from its definition of public authorities to whom section 6 would apply, 61 it is clear that some modification of legislative process was envisaged. The Act requires that draft legislation be stated compatible with the Convention rights upon being debated in Parliament (although makes provision for proposals which cannot be so endorsed to proceed). 62 The HRA has also seen the 
(a) Away from process-based review of administrative decisions?
Section 6 of the HRA renders it unlawful for public authorities -or private bodies exercising public functions -to 'act' in a way which is incompatible with the Convention rights. 66 The primary focus of section 6 is on the substance of a public body's decision:
The first question that section 6 asks is result-orientated -were the claimant's Convention rights violated by the public authority? If the answer is affirmative the process by which the public authority came to violate his or her Convention rights is irrelevant.
67
While it is certainly arguable that 'acts' of public authorities encompass the processes by which decisions were taken, adjudication under the HRA has seen a judicial reluctance to impose specific procedural requirements on public body decisions As to the departure from the traditional process focused approach of judicial
review, in R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School,
Lord Hoffmann made explicit the divergence between review on the basis of the Convention rights and the orthodox approach to judicial review:
In domestic judicial review, the court is usually concerned with whether the decision-maker reached his decision in the right way rather than whether he got what the court might think to be the right answer. But Article 9 is concerned with substance, not procedure. The role of the court in human rights adjudication is quite different from the role of the court in ordinary judicial review of administrative action. In human rights adjudication, the court is concerned with whether the human rights of the claimant have in fact been infringed, not with whether the administrative decision-maker properly took them into account.
85
It follows from this that, while the requirements of proportionality could prompt public authority decision makers to analyse the potential impact of (less intrusive)
alternatives to the proposed policy decision, this analysis need not impose an undue burden on public authorities and need not be explicitly Convention based. While it may be open to public bodies to consider the potential impact of a particular policy or decision in substantive human rights terms -and while there may be good reasons for doing so -it is not a requirement of the decision-making process which will be imposed by the court. Section 6(1) of the HRA does not therefore seem to require public bodies to engage with the substance of the Convention rights themselves during the decision-making process; it is the outcome of that process which the courts will assess for Convention compliance.
The appropriateness of this outcome-focused approach has, however, been 
22
The effect of the House of Lords' judgments … is that even where a decisionmaker decides a case by an irrational process of reasoning, or even without any consideration at all, it will be compatible with the Convention rights and it will be consistent with the decision-maker's responsibilities under the Human Rights Act, as long as the outcome is compatible with the Convention rights.
88
Given that one of the stated objectives of the HRA was to fully integrate human rights considerations in the processes of public authority decision making -an alternative view categorises the outcomes approach as being based on 'judicial exclusivity' 89 and therefore unable to fully account for, or give credit to, public body decisions which consider human rights considerations, and an inadequate characterisation of the HRA's rather more 'diffuse' scheme. 90 As a result Dickson has argued that the failure of the courts to encourage rights-respecting processes in public body decision-making 'strikes at the heart of the mission of the Human Rights Act, which is to inculcate an appreciation of human rights in all public authorities.'
(b) Towards judicial examination of legislative process?
The HRA was also intended to embed rights concerns into the pre-legislative, and legislative, processes of the United Kingdom Parliament. proportionality analysis required a more interventionist approach was discernible:
It is one thing to accept the need to defer to an opinion which can be seen to be the product of reasoned consideration based on policy; it is quite another thing to be required to accept, without question, an opinion for which no reason of policy is advanced.
98
By analogy, the court appears to acknowledge the artificiality of a proportionality assessment which is premised on the orthodox approach to statutory interpretation by the courts, that is, a sovereignty-driven acceptance of the legality of the measure under which the assessment of arguments advanced, or not advanced, during legislative debates is non-justiciable. 
V: A Moderated Approach?
In the context of review of public authority decision-making, considerations regarding the process by which the public authority arrived at the decision are not, and should not be, dismissed as irrelevant. Considerations of substance and process are not mutually exclusive; 108 the courts are grappling with the the extent of the relevance and weight that ought to be attributed to process when deciding whether a measure or … it seems to me … that where a council has properly considered the issue in relation to a particular application, the court is inherently less likely to conclude that the decision ultimately infringes the applicant's rights. and images against the interests of the wider community, a court would find it hard to upset the balance which the local authority had struck. But where there is no indication that this has been done, the court has no alternative but to strike the balance for itself, giving due weight to the judgments made by those who are in much closer touch with the people and the places involved than the court could ever be. illustrate that a failure to consider the rights implications of a decision might also permit adverse inferences to be drawn from the failure of decision-making processes to engage with the Convention implications of a decision. 112 Given the apparent primacy of outcome-focused judicial analysis highlighted by the above discussion, it is important to note that the language of section 6 does not foreclose a broader interpretation which would view 'acts' of public bodies as including decisions taken and the broader processes through which those decisions were generated. As a result, the ability of courts to scrutinise administrative processes is not definitively precluded by the HRA itself, even though the primary focus of the judicial enquiry has tended to be taken -on the basis of both section 6 and the perceived approach of the European Court -to be primarily directed towards decision-making outcomes.
By contrast with section 6, the target of section 3(1) HRA is, linguistically, beyond the constitutional Rubicon, domestic courts will be ill-positioned to fully appraise the proportionality of a legislative measure; a court's assessment of the quality of the legislative process will necessarily remain impressionistic, rather than forensic. As such, the domestic proportionality exercise will continue to display the artificiality highlighted above, given its potential disconnection from the content of relevant parliamentary debates, and the informed judicial accordance of weight will be compromised through the inability of the court to fully examine the available evidence advanced (publicly) in support of a chosen legislative course. While courts are rightly concerned to avoid the subversion of the democratic process, it is also recognised that the extent to which a decision might be legitimately referred to as the 'the considered judgment of a democratic assembly will vary according to the subject matter and the circumstances.' 118 Judicial recourse to proxies for the quality of legislative consideration may be appropriate, but cannot always provide the justificatory evidence which would underpin effective proportionality analysis. 31 be more obviously acceptable to, for instance, afford positive weight to a legislative decision taken following a manifesto commitment, consultation process and lengthy parliamentary process than it would be to afford weight to emergency legislation drafted and debated in the absence of broader deliberation. But to deny, in the latter circumstance, the courts the ability to evaluate what primary evidence in favour of the proposals may be gleaned from the parliamentary debates is to constitutionally impose an obstacle to informed proportionality analysis which denies the court the ability to fully assess whether the claimant's (or any other) interests have been considered in sufficient depth. It might be suggested that a quantitative assessment of legislative process might well be appropriate for a supra-national court seeking to give effect to principles of subsidiarity. Whether it is appropriate for a domestic court to conduct a similar exercise -and comprehensively examine the proportionality of a legislative measure -is open to question.
VI: The Interplay with Strasbourg: Subsidiarity, Complementarity or
Confusion?
The above analysis suggests a lack of continuity between the approaches to review adopted at the Strasbourg and domestic levels, and as between the standards of -and approaches to -judicial review of administrative action at common law, and the legislative and public body judicial review sanctioned by the HRA. The procedural focus of judicial review at common law has not been fully replicated either in the species of legislative or judicial review prompted by enactment of the HRA. Nor has the European Court's willingness to inform its proportionality analysis through examination of the adequacy of domestic decision-making processes been consistently acknowledged in HRA review. That domestic courts operate under the misapprehension that the European Court is largely unconcerned with matters of process speaks to both the lack of certainty as to circumstances in which process review is appropriate and provides evidence of a disconnect from the Strasbourg case law (contrary to common perceptions regarding the linkages between the domestic and supra-national levels) which might be seen to limit the potential of the HRA to instil a broad-based culture of rights.
Regardless of the administrative or legislative target of judicial review, a focus on outcomes -to the exclusion of process -'flies in the face of collaborative -
